IDCR Fellow Neo Loizides on the Greek Debt Crisis and the Balkans
Transforming Balkan Conflicts at times of Crisis
Neophytos G. Loizides, Queen’s University Belfast
© 2011 Neophytos G. Loizides
Can the Greek debt crisis create opportunities for conflict transformation in the Balkan neighbourhood? Conventional wisdom argues for limited prospects, noting that the Greek government lacks the time and energy for peace initiatives faced as it is by angry protesters, nervous international markets and dwindling popularity.
Yet as the Greek situation illustrates, postponing solutions to problems can have dire consequences, as these problems will resurface when least expected; under even more difficult conditions. Like economic crises, foreign policy crises can reappear when nations are ill prepared to take positive actions. Even worse, both can occur simultaneously.
Turning crises into opportunities for peace is not without precedent in the region. Current Greek PM, George Papandreou mastered the art of disaster diplomacy during the Greek-Turkish 1999 earthquakes. Turning a moment of weakness into an opportunity for peace proved to be the most successful initiative in Greek-Turkish peace negotiations for decades. As then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Papandreou essentially transformed the symbolic landscape of Greek-Turkish relations, stabilizing for the first time in recent history one of the most conflictual dyads in world politics. Briefly stated, negotiating during crises could be advantageous; it signals positive intentions abroad and allows concessions to be framed domestically in humanitarian rather than conventional foreign policy terms.
The name ‘Macedonia’ is a symbolic issue but with strong emotional importance. For the most part, Greece considers Macedonian heritage an integral part of its own culture and argues that the use of the very name by the neighbouring republic implies territorial ambitions. The issue is also subject to intense political competition domestically and in recent decades it has defined winners and losers in Greek national elections. In the early 1990s, current Greek opposition leader, Antonis Samaras adopted a tough-minded approach on Macedonia as then Minister of Foreign Affairs eventually defecting from his own party on this very issue. Unlike Papandreou, he mastered the art of diversionary nationalism at times of economic crisis for Greece and the Balkans. In Northern Ireland, hardliners such as Samaras are sometimes euphemistically named ‘slow learners’; yet in Samaras’ case there is little evidence of learning as the country approaches bankruptcy. Attempts by European Christian Democrats to secure Samaras’ support for reforms have failed; Socialist Pasok is now privatizing the public sector faced, opposed by the once moderate centre-right Nea Demokratia.
But there is also problematic learning from the past across the border; the new giant bronze statue of Alexander the Great erected this week in the centre of Skopje is destined to lose friends and sympathy for the country but more importantly raise divisions and unrealistic expectations among its inhabitants. The statue is a symptom of a reoccurring conflict which reinvents itself at the most difficult moments. Paradoxically, the government of the new republic has defied conventional wisdom on its own minority issues and for a decade has been implementing with relative success the highly contested Ohrid Framework Agreement aiming to bring peace with its Albanian minority. Conversely, the ‘name dispute’ remains the blind spot on both countries’ foreign policy agenda with collision approaching fast as Greece threatens to block the republic’s EU accession process.
For the most part, the choice of Greece’s neighbours is to negotiate with Papandreou today or face Samaras tomorrow possibly leading an angry bankrupt Greek public. Apparently, Papandreou is not as weak as it appears in foreign media. He has now secured the solid support of his party while opposition is bitterly divided and keeps failing to produce realistic alternatives. The crisis has injured Greek finances and pride but has also relished an unparallel energy for reforms across the country. Greek and Balkan politics could enter a new phase of transformation, however, if the Greek bankruptcy scenario wins, the consequences will spread throughout the region reversing decades of progress in managing post-communist economies and post-conflict reconstruction.
There is an additional pragmatic reason for considering foreign policy issues now. The Greek debt crisis cannot be addressed merely through loans and measures targeting fiscal deficits. Although the latter are essential to calm international markets, economic growth is essential to Greek economic recovery. The idea of using EU structural funds for this purpose is growing in European policy circles mostly because this fits current international economic interests. Ironically, the battle for the Greek economy has turned into a litmus test for the stability of the global financial system, one that Europeans are determined to win. Adjusted to serve as a ‘mini’ Marshall Plan, funds could reinvigorate Greek economy and produce growth, expanding the Greek tax base while easing the burden on the average household caused by the necessary structural reforms.
But could adjustment in the allocation of EU structural funds be linked to peace processes, integrating neighbouring to Greece regions or countries into a joint reconstruction fund? Notably, the Northern Irish peace process was facilitated by aid programs aiming for peace while transcending national boundaries.
Linking peace to financial reconstruction, however, could backfire given nervous markets and agitated publics. As in the case of Greek-Turkish earthquake diplomacy, strong public engagement is essential to legitimize peace and defeat the hawkish voices accusing moderates of selling out. In both South Africa and Northern Ireland’s peace processes, public engagement enabled leaders to transcend their difficulties and reach a peace settlement. In the issue of the name ‘Macedonia’, a north-south civic forum could include both political and civil society leaders. To be successful such a forum will need to have a clear mandate to produce outcomes and should include Macedonians from both sides of the border. Papandreou and his counterparts might not be able to secure an agreement alone but their publics and critical allies are in a position to catalyse peace.
South Africa and Northern Ireland also show how publics can be engaged in peace processes through various forms of consultation such as peace referendums. If leaders are unsure of whether their publics want to proceed with peace, the proper way to find out is to consult them. PM Papandreou has already announced a referendum on constitutional and other reforms in autumn 2011. The referendum offers a unique opportunity for the Greek public to take a position on whether its government should continue to negotiate with its neighbours on bringing peace and stability to the Balkans and the Aegean. Such early mandate referendums focusing first on its domestic constituencies could enable Greece to lead and consolidate peace initiatives within the next couple of years. Public engagement and mandate referendums have important advantages as they prepare the public for a settlement while strengthening a negotiator’s position at a time of weakened public support.
Admittedly none of these offer an easy exit from the region’s decades-old problems. Hopefully, however, conventional wisdom will fail in Greece and the Balkans, this time in the direction of peace and prosperity.
Neophytos Loizides is a Lecturer at Queen’s University Belfast and the Associate Editor of Nationalism and Ethnic Politics.He is currently a Fellow at the Institute for Democracy and Conflict Resolution (IDCR) at the University of Essex and he will be joining Kent University in September. The article draws from his presentation at the “One Decade after the Ohrid Framework Agreement. Lessons (to be) Learned from the Macedonian Experience” held in Skopje on 24-26 of June 2011 and his book (in preparation) titled Doves against Hawks: Greek-Turkish Nationalisms and the Choice of Peace.
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